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Macroeconomic Effects of Social Security 
Totalization Agreements 
Abstract 
The United States has signed international social security totalization agreements with 30 
countries. For persons working in a foreign country during part of their careers, these 
agreements reduce double taxation on social security burdens and reduce the risk of not 
qualifying for social security benefits. In this report, we consider the potential of international 
social security totalization agreements to affect macroeconomic outcomes. We find that these 
agreements are associated with higher levels of foreign direct investment. The theoretical 
framework indicates that these treaties can affect firms’ decisions to relocate their activities 
across borders, but the magnitude and direction of this effect depends on the characteristics of 
the countries involved. The effects of these agreements are larger when the share of foreign-
controlled production is smaller in the host country. 
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1. Introduction 
The United States has signed international social security treaties regarding the 
treatment of temporary foreign workers — called totalization agreements – with 30 
countries in Europe, Asia, North and South America, as well as Australia. These 
agreements typically state that the host country refrains from social security taxation of 
temporary foreign workers and that the sender country recognizes the foreign 
deployment in determining eligibility for and amount of social security benefits. 
Totalization agreements have several benefits for persons who work in a foreign country 
during part of their careers. A totalization agreement between the U.S. and a partner 
country mainly helps nationals of either working in the foreign country by letting them 
avoid dual contributions to the social security systems of the U.S. and of the other 
country, and by reducing the risk of not meeting their home country’s eligibility 
requirements (such as the minimum number of years of contributions).  
Totalization agreements’ advantages may go beyond those accruing to such 
workers. By making it less costly for workers — and their employers — to move abroad 
for periods of time, totalization agreements can encourage economic activity. Firms may 
be more likely to invest in a country with a totalization agreement, as the cost of 
temporarily reallocating labor is lower and their employees may be more willing to 
temporarily work abroad to oversee the firm's investment or their foreign affiliates. 
Because this is true for both countries participating in the agreement, foreign investment 
in both countries may increase. As in the case of reducing trade barriers, lowering 
obstacles to labor mobility with a totalization agreement may thus result in improved 
efficiency and economic outcomes for both the U.S. and the partner country. This 
project’s goal is to investigate totalization agreements’ economic effects. In particular, 
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we aim to answer the question: “What are the effects of totalization agreements on 
foreign capital movements and investment flows?”  
Multinational production — rather than international trade — has become the 
dominant way through which firms serve foreign consumers. Using data for the period 
1982 to 2007 from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
Ramondo (2014) pointed out that, while world exports went from 19% to 31% of world 
GDP during this period, total sales of multinational firms’ foreign affiliates increased 
from 24% of world GDP in 1982 to 58% in 2007. During the same period, gross product 
of foreign affiliates as a share of world GDP more than doubled. These magnitudes 
suggest that multinational firms’ foreign affiliates are more important than exports as the 
channel through which firms choose to serve foreign markets (Ramondo 2014), 
highlighting the importance of foreign direct investments (FDI).1 We will emphasize this 
channel as it is the most likely affected by totalization agreements. 
In general, the economic literature supports the idea that taxes have important 
implications for the multinational firms’ behavior. In particular, numerous papers have 
analyzed how FDI or new plant decisions are affected by corporate taxes, and they 
concluded that these taxes have a significant negative impact on foreign investment 
inflow. Existing elasticity estimates of outbound FDI with respect to corporate taxes take 
a wide range in the literature, with a median of around -3.3 (i.e., a 1% reduction in the 
host-country tax rate raises FDI in that country by 3.3%), but estimates for inbound 
investment in the U.S. take a much lower value, of around -0.5 (De Mooij and Ederveen 
2003).  
                                               
1 FDI flows refer to cross-border transactions related to direct investment. Outward (inward) 
flows represent transactions that increase the net investment investors in the source economy 
(foreign investors) have in enterprises in a foreign host economy (home economy). 
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The problem under study here is more complex, because totalization agreements 
affect labor costs by impacting the incentives of workers and firms. A few research 
papers estimate FDI elasticity with respect to labor taxes. Egger and Radulescu (2011) 
looked at labor income taxes’ effect on bilateral FDI flows using data from 52 countries. 
They found that foreign affiliates are less likely to be located in countries where average 
wage taxes and their progression are relatively high, and a higher employee-borne tax 
burden reduces managers’ effort. However, they concluded corporate tax rates are 
more important for FDI decisions than labor tax rates. Hansson and Olofsdotter (2014) 
found the differential between two countries’ top marginal labor tax rates has a negative 
impact on FDI — and this seems to have intensified over time. The literature has not 
paid much attention to the impact of social security taxation. An exception is the work by 
Egger et al. (2013), which used data for 79 countries in the years 1992 to 2009 to 
examine how labor taxes, including social security taxes, affect location choice for 
foreign affiliates’ headquarters. The research showed that an increase in employer 
social security contributions of a single percentage point reduces the probability of 
foreign affiliates location by 5.5%, more than three times greater than the effect found 
for income taxes (i.e., a similar percentage point increase leads to a reduction in the 
probability of a country as a potential headquarters location by 1.7%). 
Estimating totalization agreements’ aggregate effects is empirically challenging, 
as these effects may be dwarfed by other macroeconomic factors, such as changes in 
exchange rates or demand shocks. Even if the agreements have substantial effects on 
those firms likely to establish affiliates abroad, for example, the aggregate effect may be 
low if the number of firms affected by totalization agreements is small. Therefore, to 
answer the research question of interest, we complement the data analysis with a 
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model-based approach, relying on macroeconomic theory to evaluate this channel. Our 
approach consists of the following components: 
1. an inventory of current and proposed totalization agreements and their 
main characteristics; 
2. the analysis of existing data over time to detail the evolution of relevant 
macroeconomic phenomena, such as foreign capital movements and flow 
changes occurring around the time of the agreements; 
3. an international macroeconomic model to understand more precisely the 
potential mechanisms through which agreements affect the economies of 
participating countries; 
4. simulation of the quantitative effects of actual and counterfactual policies. 
We find that the empirical evidence indicates that these totalization agreements 
are associated with higher amounts of U.S. FDI flows. The totalization agreements 
made multinational firms’ reallocation of activities between the U.S. and the partner 
countries less expensive, and the model indicates that both inward and outward FDI 
flows should increase in the U.S. as a result. However, the agreements’ net effects 
depend on the relative productivity and resources of the partner countries. Our 
simulation exercises show that these agreements increase incentives of American firms 
to engage in outward FDI in smaller economies, such as Chile, while the U.S. may 
become more receptive to capital and investment flows from foreign firms from larger 
economies or economies with higher taxes, such as Japan. 
Section 2 provides a summary of the institutional background on totalization 
agreements. Section 3 includes a descriptive analysis of the available data. Section 4 
describes the model used and performs quantitative exercises. Section 5 concludes.  
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2. Institutional background on totalization agreements 
We compiled an inventory of existing and proposed totalization agreements and 
analyzed their most important characteristics. The sources for these analyses are 
Jackson and Cash (2018) and the Internal Revenue Service2 and the Social Security 
Administration3 website pages for totalization agreements. Since 1978, the U.S. has 
signed totalization agreements with 30 countries.  
Table 1 lists the agreements in which the U.S. participates and the effective date 
of each. In this section, we describe the main characteristics of these agreements and 
of the partner countries. We focus on the main aspects of the treaties that are expected 
to have an economic impact and on the calculation of their amounts. These aspects 
concern the elimination of dual social security coverage and taxation, which has 
implications for payroll and foreign income taxes as well as eligibility for social security 
benefits. This informs us about the kinds of workers most affected by the agreements 
and, thus, points to the potential channels through which these agreements affect 
economic activity.  
2.1 Similarities and differences across totalization agreements 
One could reasonably expect that content distinctions in the totalization 
agreements with different countries may result in heterogeneous impacts. Hence, we 
reviewed the content of the agreements. We found their similarities outweigh any 
differences. The goals of totalization agreements are similar across all, while 
dissimilarities are few across the topics meriting our attention. Perhaps the most 




important exception is Italy, where the totalization agreement allows some workers to 
choose the country to which they’ll pay taxes and from which they’ll draw benefits. 
Table 1: List of countries with totalization agreements with the U.S. 
Country Entry into Force 
Italy November 1, 1978 
Germany December 1, 1979 
Switzerland November 1, 1980 
Belgium July 1, 1984 
Norway July 1, 1984 
Canada August 1, 1984 
United Kingdom January 1, 1985 
Sweden January 1, 1987 
Spain April 1, 1988 
France July 1, 1988 
Portugal August 1, 1989 
Netherlands November 1, 1990 
Austria November 1, 1991 
Finland November 1, 1992 
Ireland September 1, 1993 
Luxembourg November 1, 1993 
Greece September 1, 1994 
South Korea April 1, 2001 
Chile December 1, 2001 
Australia October 1, 2002 
Japan October 1, 2005 
Denmark October 1, 2008 
Czech Republic January 1, 2009 
Poland March 1, 2009 
Slovak Republic May 1, 2014 
Hungary September 1, 2016 
Brazil October 1, 2018 
Uruguay November 1, 2018 
Slovenia February 1, 2019 
Iceland March 1, 2019 
        Source: SSA 
2.1.1 Common aspects to most agreements 
We start by describing similarities across the agreements and how they may 
affect their economic impact. In our model, we will note a “home” or “source country” 
and a “host” or “destination country.” However, in legal terms, which is the home country 
may not be so obvious as in our stylized model.  
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In general, the principle in totalization agreements signed by the U.S. is that 
workers should pay taxes and be covered under the social security system of only one 
country, which is usually where they are employed — the territoriality rule. But there is 
an exception provided for workers sent to a country by their employer on a temporary 
assignment; this is referred to as the detached worker rule. To determine whether the 
detached worker rule exception applies for a specific worker, the totalization 
agreements refer to a concept of greater economic attachment. The agreements thus 
determine that individuals pay the social security taxes to the country determined to be 
the one with greater economic attachment and include rules on how to make that 
determination.4 
2.1.2 Rules about determination of greater economic attachment.  
Generalizing, an American worker sent abroad by an American employer with the 
intention of being there for fewer than five years will be determined to have greater 
economic attachment to the U.S., and so will contribute only to the U.S. Social Security 
system. But for people hired while in the foreign country or hired by a foreign-based 
firm, they will be deemed to have greater economic attachment to the foreign country 
(the same rules apply the other way around).5 
                                               
4 Source: IRS https://www.irs.gov/government-entities/federal-state-local-
governments/totalization-agreements 
5 A worker gets a certification from her “home” country. For example, when American firms send 
workers on temporary assignment for an affiliate in a partner country, the Social Security 
Administration can send these employees, through their employers, a certificate that acts as a 
tax declaration to demonstrate there is no need to pay the foreign nation’s social security 
taxes. Self-employed workers based in America who work temporarily in another country can 
submit the request for a certificate themselves. It is necessary, however, that the self-
employed person intends to stay no longer than five years. 
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Given this understanding of what totalization agreements do in practice, we 
determined the channels through which they affect workers (and, hence, firms and 
economic activity in general) are the following: 
1. elimination of the double taxation incurred when a person must contribute 
to the social security system of both the home and host countries; 
2. totalization of benefits, which reduces the risk of not qualifying to a 
pension due to “qualifying quarters” being spread across countries 
(Totalization agreements allow workers to combine, or "totalize," coverage 
credits from both nations.); 
3. increasing workers’ future pension amounts by allowing them to contribute 
to the social security system in the country that will eventually provide their 
benefits. 
These three points guide our analysis and economic modeling in the sections 
ahead. Note, however, that one could not simply assign an economic value to each of 
the points above and add them up, as in most cases individuals will only benefit from 
one or two of the points above.  
To understand this, consider the example of a worker contributing to two social 
security systems, the U.S. and that of a country where there is no totalization 
agreement in effect. A totalization agreement would benefit her by reducing the amount 
she pays in contributions to the two systems. But, in any case, she would not be at risk 
of not qualifying for a pension and, hence, would not be benefited by the second 
channel. Likewise, a totalization agreement would not increase the benefit amount she 
will eventually receive and, hence, she would not benefit from the third channel.  
On the other hand, consider the alternative example of a worker who was not 
paying social security taxes in her home country, but was contributing to other countries’ 
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social security systems for periods too short to qualify for benefits. In that case, she 
would benefit from the totalization aspect of an agreement (points two and/or three) but 
not from point one. 
From the modeling perspective, we note these three channels have more or less 
the same effect. That is, they reduce the cost of sending an employee to work in the 
partner country. This cost may be borne by the firm or the employee, or it may be 
shared. In a competitive labor market, the cost of the double taxation will be borne by 
the firms (which we discuss further in Section 4). 
With social security programs having minimum contribution period amounts, and 
totalization agreements helping workers reach those minimums, this implies anomalies 
where some workers close to the threshold are very strongly affected while others (for 
example, those past the threshold) are not. In our model in Section 4, we abstract from 
these asymmetries. 
The third channel also may imply some heterogeneity across workers because 
those with high subjective discount rates — or those who are inattentive to their 
retirement situation — may not value the pension benefits as much. (In those cases, 
their firms may not have to adjust payments as much when sending them to a country 
without a totalization agreement).  
2.1.3 Totalization agreement with Germany 
The Totalization Agreement with Germany was signed in 1979, the second such 
agreement signed by the U.S. The agreement covers retirement, disability, and survivor 
benefits and, hence, helps many people who without it would not be eligible for such 
benefits under the social security system of one the two countries. 
If a person’s work is covered by both the U.S. and German social security 
systems, the worker (and their employer) would normally have to pay social security 
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taxes to both countries for the same work. The agreement eliminates this double 
coverage, so that taxes are paid to only one system. The U.S. Social Security tax is 
12.4% (half of which is payable by the employer and half by the employee), for income 
that falls below US$132,900 (in 2019).6 Germany social security taxes 18.7% of the first 
US$86,580. Hence, the savings due to elimination of double SS-taxation can be 
substantial. 
It also helps people who would otherwise have to pay other types of taxes, 
specifically Medicare taxes and analogous foreign taxes, to both countries on the same 
earnings. In the case of Germany, the totalization agreement covers the Medicare taxes 
and the corresponding taxes in Germany that finance Germany's sickness insurance 
and long-term nursing care programs. 
If a person has Social Security credits in both the U.S. and Germany but does 
not have enough of them to be eligible for benefits in either country, the agreement 
makes it easier to qualify for benefits by letting the beneficiary add the Social Security 
credits in both countries. In the U.S., beneficiaries need a minimum of 10 years (40 
quarterly credits), while in Germany they require at least five years. Take the example of 
an American sent to work in Germany for two years and who had accumulated 35 
quarterly credits in the U.S. If she stops working upon her return to the U.S., she would 
not be able to claim Social Security retirement benefits absent a totalization agreement 
unless she had paid Social Security taxes in both countries during her time there. On 
the other hand, thanks to the totalization agreement, she would accumulate eight 
additional credits while in Germany as she would be covered by the U.S. system while 
                                               
6 Additionally, there is a 2.9% Medicare tax rate on earnings, which is not subject to the Social 
Security tax cap on earnings. An additional Medicare tax of 0.9% applies for income above 
$200,000 (if filing single) or $250,000 (if married, filing jointly). 
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on assignment there. With the eight additional credits, she would have 43 total credits 
thereby qualifying for U.S. SS-retirement benefits. 
2.1.4 Totalization agreement with Chile 
As in the case of other totalization agreements, the one with Chile benefits 
people in one of two ways: the “eliminating dual coverage for employment” aspect that 
allows people to avoid paying SS-taxes in both countries and the “totalization” aspect 
that allows people to add the credits accumulated in both countries to satisfy the 
requirement for benefits in one of the countries. The Chilean agreement, in addition, 
means U.S. workers who are temporarily in Chile also do not need to pay taxes for  
national health insurance and workers’ compensation. 
Chile’s case is interesting because it has implemented far-reaching reforms in its 
pension and social security system. Because the reforms are not retroactive, people 
born in different years are subject to different rules. The old Chilean system was a 
defined-benefit program. In order to qualify for retirement benefits, there was a 10-year 
contribution period requirement, as well as a requirement to have contributed within the 
two years of the time of retirement. The defined contribution program was established in 
1980 and consists of individual accounts, but those who contribute for 20 years are 
eligible for a guaranteed minimum. 
The “eliminating dual coverage for employment” aspect of the totalization 
agreement reduces firms’ costs of sending workers to the partner country. For example, 
for an American resident temporarily sent to Chile to work, the totalization agreement 
means that the American worker does not need to open an individual pension account 
in Chile and make the obligatory contribution per Chilean law. For someone sent for a 
short period of time, having a pension account with only a few months or years of 
contributions may have little benefit and substantial administrative costs. Hence, 
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allowing the worker to contribute only to her home-country system may lead to 
substantial savings and encourage bilateral investments across the two countries.  
The totalization agreement between the U.S. and Chile includes non-national 
residents. Hence, the examples above apply to permanent residents in the U.S. and 
Chilean residents who are not citizens of either country as long as the “country of 
greater economic attachment” rule is satisfied. For example, a national of a third country 
who works for an American company in the U.S., but who is sent to work to Chile 
temporarily can apply (or have his company apply on his behalf) for a Certification of 
Coverage from the U.S. SSA, which would allow him to avoid paying Social Security 
taxes while in Chile. 
2.1.5 Differences 
In most totalization agreements, the territoriality rule and detached worker rule 
serve to determine greater economic attachment. An exception to this is the agreement 
between the U.S. and Italy, which permits certain transferred workers to select the 
social security system under which they will be covered rather than it being assigned 
through the greater economic attachment rule (Jackson and Cash 2018). No 
other U.S. totalization agreement contains a similar rule. 
Another source of variation across totalization agreements is the length of a 
“temporary” assignment. However, even in this dimension, there are few exceptions to 
the general rule. For most totalization agreements, the period of expected temporary 
assignment is five years or fewer, but, in some cases, they allow for one- or two-year 
extensions beyond the five-year period. Workers relocating permanently or for an 
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intended period longer than five years should have coverage under the destination 
country’s system.7  
A final source of variation is whether certain provisions of the totalization 
agreement covers only a country’s citizens or also its permanent residents. Most 
agreements cover all residents per the rule of country of greatest attachment, but the 
following totalization agreements remove payment restrictions only for nationals of the 
two partner countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland.8  
2.2 Similarities and differences in the characteristics of partner countries  
2.2.1 Economic characteristics 
To understand totalization agreements’ likely effects on the U.S. economy, it is 
important to consider the other participating countries’ economic characteristics. Higher-
income countries that are home to multinational firms are more likely to take advantage 
of a totalization agreement and send workers to an affiliate in the U.S. In addition, 
countries with more advanced economies, larger markets, and a more skilled workforce 
are more likely to be attractive places for American firms to open a branch. Hence, 
partner countries’ economic characteristics are likely to be important determinants of the 
magnitude of a totalization agreement’s impacts. Table 2 shows economic 
characteristics of the countries with which the U.S. has signed totalization agreements.  
  
                                               
7 Some countries allow for an extension beyond five years, which is typically no longer than two 
years and is decided on a case-by-case basis. 
8 Social Security Administration, https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v78n4/v78n4p1.html. 
Furthermore, in the case of Belgium, the coverage and benefit provisions also apply only to 
nationals of the two countries. 
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Table 2: Economic characteristics of countries with totalization agreements  
with the U.S. 










Australia 1,257,101 49,158 24.6 40,421 5,145 -34,482 
Austria 393,265 43,057 8.8 14,184 14,178 -5 
Belgium 477,694 39,537 11.38 -35,879 -7,634 28,245 
Brazil 2,075,703 8,979 207.83 63,847 17,586 -46,260 
Canada 1,697,690 40,957 36.54 25,279 74,696 49,411 
Chile 247,553 13,665 18.47 5,318 4,700 -618 
Czech Rep. 219,076 18,520 10.59 10,210 8,542 -1,667 
Denmark 326,682 51,998 5.76 2,142 6,481 4,339 
Finland 238,061 41,625 5.51 12,659 12,908 -2,954 
France 2,612,938 35,150 66.87 43,017 51,821 12,650 
Germany 3,529,467 40,604 82.66 75,803 124,858 49,054 
Greece 225,304 17,160 10.75 3,245 517.9875 -2,730 
Hungary 139,610 12,976 9.79 -11,765 -13,748 -1,984 
Iceland 16,003 64,808 0.34 -6,361 -6,509 -148 
Ireland 325,729 62,651 4.81 -3,122 -38,875 -50,296 
Italy 1,927,068 29,221 60.54 8,313 11,820 3,498 
Japan 5,580,961 34,834 126.79 18,557 157,976 139,419 
Korea, Rep. 1,223,132 27,029 51.47 16,278 30,960 14,682 
Luxembourg 57,725 94,963 0.6 6,019 37,400 59,733 
Netherlands 839,431 44,059 17.13 5,462 4,042 43,577 
Norway 438,550 68,796 5.28 9,699 3,826 -1,421 
Poland 546,162 12,596 37.97 9,108 657.935 -5,873 
Portugal 217,138 19,348 10.3 1,290 6,616 -8,451 
Slovak Rep. 98,277 15,975 5.44 5,382 3,652 -1,729 
Slovenia 48,114 21,310 2.07 983 552.52 -514 
Spain 1,371,985 25,634 46.59 5,638 23,734 18,096 
Sweden 517,418 48,394 10.06 21,974 31,843 9,869 
Switzerland 594,879 73,003 8.45 62,057 -4,712 -66,769 
U.K. 2,561,494 36,288 66.06 110,185 125,436 15,253 
U.S. 15,765,540 54,460 325.15 322,450 344,617 27,193 
Uruguay 45,089 14,937 3.44 2,355 4,359 1,967 
World 72,890,111 9,786 7,510.99    
High income(f) 46,829,160 38,482 1,204.43    
Notes: (a), (c)-(e) in millions of 2010 USD. (b) USD of 2010. Source: World Development 
Indicators, World Bank. All data is for 2017. (f) Includes all countries considered as “high 
income” per the World Bank’s definition of having a high gross national income per capita above 
$12,376 in 2019. 
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For the most part, these countries are developed, with highly-educated 
populations and high incomes. Save for Brazil, all countries classify as “High Income” 
per the definition of the World Bank.9 Most totalization agreements have been signed 
with countries in Europe and East Asia, with GDP per capita of a level close to, or 
above the average GDP per capita of high-income economies (which in 2017 was 
around $42,000 per person, or $38,482 in 2010 USD). The list of countries includes 
some small nations with very high per capita incomes, such as Iceland, Luxembourg, 
Norway, and Switzerland, as well as some large economies with incomes around the 
US$40,000 mark, such as France, Germany, and Japan. 
More recently, the U.S. has signed totalization agreements with relatively lower 
income countries (per capita income levels between US$10,000 and around 
US$20,000), mostly in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Among them are several that 
until recently were considered “high middle income” by the World Bank, including Chile, 
Uruguay, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic. These tend to be smaller countries in 
terms of population and total GDP, so it is likely that the impact of these agreements 
upon the American economy has been smaller. Among these countries, the largest in 
terms of GDP are Poland, with a GDP of around $546 billion, and Chile, with a GDP of 
$248 billion (all in 2010 USD). 
Brazil, with which the U.S. signed a totalization agreement in 2018, is the only 
country in the list with a GDP per capita below the world average of US$9,786. The 
economic impacts of agreements with countries like Brazil may be different because of 
the different economic development level. The effects may be important, too, given the 
                                               
9 The World Bank defines a country as “high income” if its gross national income per capita is 
above US$12,376. 
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size of the Brazilian economy, with a population of more than 207 million and a GDP of 
USD$2.1 trillion.10  
The countries with which the U.S. has signed totalization agreements also vary in 
terms of openness, and the levels of FDI inflows and outflows. Though no partner 
country has a level of FDI flows as high as the U.S. (more than US$300 billion both 
inward and outward), some do have high levels in both directions (Germany has about 
US$83 billion inflow and US$137 billion outflow). Brazil had very high levels of inward 
FDI (US$70 billion) in 2017 but not as much outward (US$19 billion). Japan had lower 
levels of incoming FDI (US$19 billion) and high levels of outgoing FDI (US$173 billion). 
Other partner countries have much lower levels of FDI flows, such as Chile (US$6 
billion outflow and US$6.7 billion inflows in 2017). 
2.2.2. Characteristics of the social security systems 
The totalization agreements’ effects may be affected not only by the content of 
the agreement and the general economic characteristics of the partner country, but also 
by the characteristics of the nations’ respective social security systems. This follows 
from the fact that totalization agreements include rules about which social security 
system to participate in. Hence, a totalization agreement’s impacts likely will depend on 
the characteristics of the partner country’s social security system.  
If a partner country has a social security system with high required contributions, 
then the effect of reducing the double taxation for U.S. firms sending American workers 
to the partner country likely will be relatively high. On the other hand, if a partner country 
has relatively low contributions, then the likely impacts will be low. 
                                               
10 Due to the recency of this agreement, there are no data to evaluate its effects. 
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Analyzing a subset of partner countries’ social security systems, we found 
similarities in some aspects of the systems directly relevant for the analysis of 
totalization agreements. Similarities include the following: 1) There is a required taxation 
of labor income above a certain threshold (in some countries that threshold is zero); 2) 
there is a fixed social security tax rate above that threshold; and, 3) a threshold above 
which labor income is not taxed. Most variation in the payments into the system can be 
analyzed in this manner. Table 3 describes the social security systems along these 
dimensions among the selected subset of partner countries. 
In terms of the rates paid, differences are moderate. Social security contribution 
rates to pay for old age, disability, and survivor benefits are typically in the 12% to 19% 
range, with the exception of Brazil, where rates are substantially higher (28%). 
However, there is stronger variation in terms of the upper threshold amount, the “wage 
ceiling,” which affects the effective tax rate high earners actually pay. Japan has a 
relatively high wage ceiling, with social security contributions capped at 620,000 JPY 
per month, which means that only annual earnings above 40.7 million JPY (around 
US$382,000) do not incur additional social security taxation.  
Relatively less developed countries have lower values of the threshold. In Chile, 
incomes beyond a level of 908 Unidades de Fomento (which in 2017 corresponded to 
about $36,000) pay no social security contributions. This likely responds to the fact that 
the earnings distribution in that country is to the left of the income distribution in 
developed countries. This has important implications for the analysis of its totalization 
agreement, as employees of American firms who would be deployed to Chile under a 
situation of no totalization agreements would be more modestly affected by double 
taxation because a large fraction of their earnings would be above the threshold — 
hence, nontaxable.  
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Also likely to be important are the characteristics of social security systems in 
terms of benefits paid and qualifying requirements. Here, what matters are the 
characteristics of the sending country’s social security system. Assume a country has 
relatively strong requirements in terms of the number of quarters/years an employee 
must work to qualify for retirement benefits. In this case, fewer people will want to take 
on an assignment abroad absent a totalization agreement, as more people may 
otherwise fail to meet the threshold. On the other hand, if a country requires few 
quarters, there will be many more workers who will have already satisfied the quarter 
requirement, and therefore are less likely to be concerned that failing to contribute in a 
given year to their home country will affect their entitlement.  
Table 3: Characteristics of social security system contributions  
in selected countries 
Country Tax Rate 
Overall* Wage Ceiling 
Brazil 28%a  
Chile 13.54%b* ~$36,000t 
Germany 18.7% $86,580 
Japan 18.3%c ~$382,164 
USA 12.4% $132,900 
Notes: *Tax rates shown are those paid for old-age, disability, and survivor benefits. Sources: 
ILO (2017) and SSA (2018b, 2018c, 2019). aLower rates allowed for small businesses and self-
employed. Rural sector excepted. b This is based on the Mandatory individual account program 
started in 1980. Rate amounts to 12.82% total under the DB program (source: SSA 2018c, 
Table 4). The maximum annual earnings used to calculate contributions are 908.4 UFs (Unidad 
de Fomento; up to ~$36,000 annually as of 2017.  c Used to be 17,8% (8.9% employer and 
employee). 
Likewise, the level of benefits can be important. The more generous the 
retirement benefits are in a country, the more likely it is that workers there will be 
concerned about meeting the requirement for receiving benefits (that is, the more they 
will require as compensation). Hence, the higher the benefits in a sending country’s 
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social security system, the more impact a totalization agreement will have. Table 4 
describes the characteristics of the social security systems’ eligibility requirements and 
shows the average net pension replacement rates, including income from social security 
retirement benefits.  
Table 4: Benefit characteristics of social security systems 
Country Number of years of contribution or employment 




Australia N.A. 42.6 
Austria 15 years 91.8 
Belgium 66.7% of a full career (based on 208 days for 45 
years) to qualify for the Guaranteed minimum pension 
66.1 
Brazil 15 years 76.4 
Canada 1 year 53.4 
Chile 10 years (and contribute within two years prior to 
reaching retirement age). 20 years to qualify for 
minimum benefit under new program c 
40.1 
Czech Republic N.A. 60 
Denmark N.A. 80.2 
Finland 3 years of residence (full pension if reside for 80% of 
period from age 16 to 64) b 
65 
France 0.25 years (between 163 and 172 quarters for full 
pension 
74.5 
Germany 5 years 50.5 
Greece 15 years 53.7 
Hungary 20 years 89.6 
Iceland N.A. (40 years for full pension private sector) 75.7 
Ireland 520 weeks (less than 10 years) 42.3 
Italy 15 years 93.2 
Japan 10 years (40 years for full pension) 40 
Luxembourg 20 years for minimum guaranteed pension 88.4 
Netherlands N.A.  100.6 
Norway 3 years of residence (40 years for full) b 48.8 
Poland 20 years for men and 15 years for women 38.6 
Portugal 15 years 94.9 
Slovak Republic 15 years 83.8 
Slovenia 20 years 56.7 
South Korea 20 years 45.1 
Spain 15 years with at least 2 years in the last 15 years 81.8 
Sweden 3 years 54.9 
Switzerland N.A.a  44.9 
United Kingdom 1 year (30 years for full) 29 
United States 40 quarters 44.8 
Uruguay 15 years at age 70 (more to retire earlier) Not available 
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Notes: *Sources Table B.9 of ILO (2017), Tables 4 of SSA (2018b, 2018c, 2019) ** Pension 
Income as a % of preretirement income, defined as the individual net pension entitlement 
divided by net preretirement earnings, taking into account personal income taxes and social 
security contributions paid by workers and pensioners. Note that it includes pension sources 
beyond Social Security. Source: OECD Data (data.oecd.org). a Benefit is paid as 6.8% of the 
total balance in personal account at the time of retirement. b Resident requirement.c The rules 
described here are for 1980. 
3. Analysis of macroeconomic flows 
3.1 Data 
The implementation of totalization agreements may impact macroeconomic 
outcomes of the participating countries, such as flows of capital and investment 
between them. We used the time series from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
about FDI flows and activities of U.S. multinational firms’ foreign affiliates and foreign 
multinational firms’ U.S. affiliates. For all countries for which data are available, we 
conducted an event study analysis around the time the treaties were put into place to 
characterize the evolution of bilateral flows. This provides suggestive evidence of how 
the agreements may have impacted these flows.  
Additionally, we measured how treaties affected bilateral employment flows and 
used these data to quantify the model in the next section. For this, we constructed the 
evolution of employment flows specifically for workers covered by totalization 
agreements by leveraging the following additional data sources. To generate descriptive 
statistics of the flows of American workers who have benefited from totalization 
agreements over time, we used data from the U.S. Certificates of Coverage issued to 
Americans working abroad. Also included in the descriptive analysis were data from 
foreign Certificates of Coverage, available for a subset of years and countries, issued to 
workers moving to the U.S.  
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We complemented this information with tax-filing data from the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS). We used the number of foreign-earned income credit exclusion tax forms 
filed by American taxpayers to analyze the impact of totalization agreements on the flow 
of U.S. workers going to work abroad. The IRS reports these numbers for 1987 and 
every five years between 1991 and 2011.11 For the countries with available data, we 
measured how treaties’ enactments affected these flows, conducting event studies 
around the time the agreements were put in place. For an analysis of flows of foreign 
workers coming to work in the U.S., we used data on certain types of nonimmigrant 
visas,12 by nationality, issued by the U.S. Department of State since 1997. Though not 
everyone coming to the U.S. with a certain type of visa necessarily is covered by a 
totalization agreement, this information is a good proxy. In particular, inflow changes 
from partner countries of individuals with the relevant visas are likely to be strongly 
correlated with changes in the number of individuals covered by an agreement.  
As an additional component of the descriptive evidence, we report statistics on 
the benefits paid over time to workers covered by totalization agreements. This is 
especially informative about past flows of workers for countries with the oldest bilateral 
agreements, and serves as a quantitative check for the model as explained in the next 
section.  
3.2 Magnitude of totalization agreements 
To benefit from the coverage provisions of a totalization agreement, workers 
must file a certificate of coverage with the respective authorities. These certificates 
                                               
11 https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-foreign-earned-income-foreign-tax-credit 
12 In particular, we consider visa categories that — like the L, H and E categories — are the 
most likely ones to be granted to temporary workers who might benefit from the totalization 
agreements. 
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contain some basic information, such as the worker’s name and Social Security Number 
(or foreign equivalent), information about the employer, and begin and end dates of the 
foreign assignment. The SSA provided us with information about U.S. certificates of 
coverage for the period 2009 to 2018 and foreign certificates for 2009 to 2015. The data 
include, for each anonymized certificate, the year it was received, the partner country, 
and the begin and end date of the assignment.13 Table 5 reports data on the number of 
certificates submitted by American workers for assignments abroad and the number of 
certificates for foreign workers on assignment in the U.S., for the years where the data 
are most reliable.   
  
                                               
13 The data are incomplete, however. For some certificates, begin and end dates are blank, and 
for some country/year combinations, only a subset of certificates have been entered, or none 
at all. This is especially true for foreign-issued certificates, for which we only have a small 
subsample. We received a separate file of counts of foreign certificates, but these are also 
tentative, and most reliable for 2009, 2010, and 2012, which we are reporting in Table 5. In 
general, the tables and figures based on the certificate data should be viewed as illustrations 
of patterns rather than as definitive numbers. 
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(2009, 2010, 2012) 
 Total Avg per year Total Avg per year 
Australia 13,403 1,340  n/a n/a  
Austria 1,172 117  271 90  
Belgium 7,706 771  1,820 607  
Brazil 99 —  — —  
Canada 33,927 3,393  7,323 2,441  
Chile 2,041 204  n/a n/a  
Czech Republic 1,504 151  120 60  
Denmark 962 96  972 324  
Finland 869 87  1,040 347  
France 18,484 1,848  n/a n/a  
Germany 20,440 2,044  6,976 2,325  
Greece 891 89  n/a n/a  
Hungary 476 238  — —  
Ireland 3,852 385  2,379 793  
Italy 7,555 756  333 111  
Japan 10,413 1,041  20,743 6,914  
South Korea 1,368 342  1,293 431  
Luxembourg 785 79  582 194  
Netherlands 6,242 624  4,431 1,477  
Norway 2,873 287  1,141 380  
Poland 1,384 145  184 85  
Portugal 780 78  n/a n/a  
Slovakia 107 27  — —  
Spain 7,610 761  1,242 414  
Sweden 2,388 239  573 191  
Switzerland 10,760 1,076  n/a n/a  
United Kingdom 41,134 4,113  6,203 2,068  
Total 199,227 19,923  57,626 19,252  
Note: Data are incomplete and should be viewed as roughly indicative 
of relative patterns. Averages per year only include years with available 
data and exclude the first (calendar) year in which an agreement was in 
effect. n/a: Not available; —: agreement not in effect yet.  Source: SSA 
With the caveat that these data (in particular the foreign data) are far from 
complete, and that the years covered are not the same, this table suggests that the 
numbers of U.S. and foreign certificates per year are of similar magnitude overall, 
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although this does not hold on a country by country basis. Furthermore, the number of 
workers under totalization varies greatly by country. This may be due to the size of the 
country, characteristics of the country's workforce and productive structure, and 
characteristics of the country's social security system. Our model in Section 4 takes 
such characteristics into account. 
Figure 1 shows the number of U.S. coverage certificates issued over time. The 
number of certificates has increased over time. Data for the last available year are 
incomplete, with a smaller set of countries, which explains the apparent drop. The 
timing of the certificates does not indicate the start of a foreign assignment, only when 
the certificate was issued. The number of certificates active during at least part of any 
given year will be higher (depending on the average duration of the assignments as 
presented below), because this includes certificates that have been issued in previous 
years that pertain to multi-year assignments, and the cumulative number of certificates 
ever issued is much higher still. 
Figure 2 shows the duration distribution of the assignments listed on the 
certificates of coverage issued in the U.S. and abroad. From these figures, we see the 
vast majority of assignments for which a certificate is issued are for five years or less. 
This is, of course, expected given that only under rare exceptions will a totalization 
agreement allow exception from the territoriality rule on stays longer than five years. 
This indicates that for most of these assignments, the country of greater economic 
attachment will be the worker’s own country. In our data, a handful of assignments have 
a duration of more than 10 years. These have been excluded from the graphs, but this 
does not affect the conclusion. 
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Figure 1: Number of U.S. certificates of coverage for totalization agreements 
(2009-2018) 
 
Note: Data for the last year are available for only a subset of countries, so the apparent drop 
does not reflect the actual trend. Source: SSA 
Furthermore, we observe a clear pattern of bunching at whole years. However, 
there still are many assignments, especially shorter assignments, with durations that are 
not whole years. It is also noteworthy that there are spikes near zero.14  
  
                                               
14 Precise zeros and negative durations have been excluded, which are likely coding errors. We 
expect that very short assignments (say, up to three months) in a foreign country would simply 
be business visits and in many cases would not require a formal certificate of coverage, so 
part of these may also be coding errors, but we did not exclude these because they may be 
valid. From the data available to us, we could not deduce whether these were temporary 
assignments to a foreign country by the home country employer or a foreign employer’s 
temporary jobs in the foreign country. 
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Figure 2: Duration distribution of the assignments 
U.S. certificates (2009 to 2018) Foreign certificates (2009 to 2015) 
  
Source: SSA 
3.3 Characteristics of affected individuals 
The SSA provided us with a data set about the earnings of individuals 
contributing to the U.S. Social Security system under a totalization agreement for the 
years 2009 to 2017. There are two types of earnings concepts: “OASDI earnings,” 
which are subject to Social Security taxation under the Old-Age, Survivors, and 
Disability Insurance (OASDI) program, and “Medicare earnings,” which are subject to 
Medicare taxation. Not all jobs are covered by Social Security and, thus, subject to 
Social Security taxation. This applies especially to government jobs. There is no such 
exclusion for Medicare. Furthermore, earnings are capped at the Social Security 
maximum for Social Security taxation. This maximum was $106,800 in 2009 and 
increased to $127,200 in 2017.15 In this section’s graphs and tables, we converted all 
amounts to 2015 dollars using the consumer price index (CPI), which means the Social 
Security maximum was $117,991 in 2015 dollars (real terms) in 2009 and $122,995 in 
                                               
15 https://www.ssa.gov/oact/COLA/cbb.html 
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2017. Both OASDI earnings and Medicare earnings reported here include earnings as 
an employee as well as self-employment earnings, if any.16  
Figure 3 shows, by year, the average and median earnings of U.S. workers who 
filed certificates of coverage under a totalization agreement. Earnings of such workers 
were high relative to the average earnings of American workers.17 The median OASDI 
earnings were at or near the Social Security maximum in all these years, meaning that 
about half the affected workers earned more than the Social Security maximum. The 
mean was not much lower, which implies there is not a substantial fraction of affected 
workers whose earnings are far below the Social Security maximum. Further supporting 
this are the much higher average and median Medicare earnings. This suggests 
individuals who submitted certificates of coverage were mostly managers and 
professionals. We used this assumption in the development of our theoretical model in 
Section 4. 
Figure 4 shows the average real earnings over these years by country of 
destination. Despite overall average OASDI earnings being closer to the Social Security 
maximum, workers sent to some smaller countries, such as Greece and Slovakia, have 
lower average earnings. The average Medicare earnings vary widely across countries, 
but are not always consistent with the host country’s average income level. We 
conjecture that this may be partly due to outliers and the relatively small numbers of 
workers for some countries. 
  
                                               
16 The SSA obtained these data from the IRS, which computed them from W-2 forms for 
employment earnings and Schedule SE for self-employment earnings. 
17 The national average wage index for 2017 is $50,321.89 (Source: SSA, 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/AWI.html) 
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Figure 3: Annual earnings of individuals under totalization agreements by year 
 
Source: SSA 
Figure 4: Annual earnings of U.S. individuals under totalization agreements by 




The SSA’s Annual Statistical Supplement (2018)18 provides information about the 
number of individuals receiving Social Security benefits in the U.S. who have been 
affected by totalization agreements. These are workers, either Americans or U.S. 
residents who worked in a foreign country for a period in their lives, whose country of 
greater economic attachment was the U.S. and are now receiving benefits. Although not 
everyone receiving totalized benefits has filed a certificate of coverage, the overall 
trends should be similar.19  
Figure 5 shows the total number of beneficiaries by year since 1983. 
Unsurprisingly given the increased number of agreements and the gradual aging of 
workers into retirement, the number of beneficiaries has been increasing, from close to 
zero in 1983 to 237,000 in 2018. According to the same Annual Supplement, the total 
number of Social Security benefit recipients was about 63 million in 2018, so about 
0.4% of recipients were affected by totalization agreements in 2018. 
Figure 5: Number of totalization beneficiaries by year 
 
Source: SSA 
                                               
18 Table 5.M1, available from https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/index.html 
19 Examples of this are people who worked in the U.S. before the agreements went into force or 
those hired in the U.S. locally who may later receive a totalized benefit but were never issued 
a certificate of coverage. 
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Table 6 shows the average number of U.S. beneficiaries per year by host country 
for the period 1999 to 2018. The averages for countries with totalization agreements 
more recent than 1999 correspond to the years when the agreements were in place. As 
expected, the annual number of beneficiaries by country is strongly correlated with the 
number of certificates (Table 5) and with the elapsed time since the agreement was 
introduced (Table 1).  
Table 6: Average annual number of U.S. beneficiaries and monthly benefits (in 




Average number of 
beneficiaries per year 
Australia 16 2,743 
Austria 20 1,281 
Belgium 20 812 
Canada 20 47,175 
Chile 17 168 
Czech Republic 10 92 
Denmark 10 535 
Finland 20 311 
France 20 4,961 
Germany 20 19,226 
Greece 20 3,697 
Hungary 2 30 
Ireland 20 2,204 
Italy 20 9,024 
Japan 13 39,690 
Luxembourg 20 79 
Netherlands 20 2,289 
Norway 20 3,570 
Poland 10 8,895 
Portugal 20 2,381 
Slovakia 5 19 
South Korea 15 1,950 
Spain 20 2,814 
Sweden 20 2,622 
Switzerland 20 3,951 
United Kingdom 20 16,067 
Total 20 156,831 
Note. Number of years varies across countries because some totalization agreements 
were enacted after 1999. Source: SSA 
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Totalized benefits were less than $240 in 2018, whereas the average benefits of 
all recipients were $1,267 (in 2015 dollars). Totalized benefits are prorated to be 
proportional to the time that the worker paid into the U.S. Social Security system.20  
3.4 Employers listed on U.S. certificates 
To get an impression of what kinds of employers send their employees on foreign 
assignments, SSA provided us with lists of employers named on U.S. certificates of 
coverage submitted from 2009 through 2018. These were not linked to individual 
records, but we still could study the number of certificates per employer from these lists. 
There are 10,000 to 20,000 records per year, with 148,431 records in total. 
A challenge with analyzing data in which the identifiers are text fields (e.g., name, 
address) is that these identifiers are often inconsistently spelled. For example, we might 
see My Company as well as My Company, Inc. and My Company Inc with no period for 
the abbreviation and no comma. We performed a small amount of standardization but 
did not try to obtain the “best” or “smallest” set of company names. Specifically, we 
transformed all employer names to lowercase; removed all periods and commas; put 
spaces around ampersands; removed the words inc, incorporated, llc, llp, ltd, 
corporation (but not corporate), and company; replaced self employed with self-
employed; removed an initial word the, removed all leading and trailing spaces, and 
                                               
20 The pro rata factor is the number of quarters the individual worked under a totalization 
agreement as a fraction of the individual's total number of covered quarters (truncated at the 
35 years used for AIME computations). It is worth noting that totalized benefits may only 
correspond to workers who are not fully insured for social security benefits due to their 
accumulated quarters of coverage in the U.S.  A person with more than 39 quarters of U.S. 
coverage would be fully insured for benefits, and would not receive totalization benefits (unless 
they are using foreign periods of coverage for purposes of meeting the recency-of-work 
requirement for entitlement to disability benefits). 
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condensed all consecutive internal spaces to single spaces. These particular choices 
were driven by iteratively listing the 100 most-commonly mentioned employers, then 
screening out duplicates. We did not combine My Company, My Company U.S., My 
Company International, and similar distinctions. We saw such designators in the lists, as 
well as other indicators of multiple branches of the same company. 
After this standardization, we ended up with 18,148 employers — including self-
employed, which occurs 2,600 times. The mean number of records per employer is 
slightly more than eight, but the distribution of number of records per employer is highly 
skewed: More than half of the employers have only one record, and the 75th percentile 
is three records. Slightly more than 1% of employers have more than 100 records. The 
top 100 employers with the most records are dominated by large multinational firms: 
energy, financial companies, manufacturing (including automobiles and 
pharmaceuticals), business consulting, construction, and software, but it also contains 
some other types of companies (some lesser known) and organizations of Christian 
missionaries and teachers. 
3.5 Event study analysis 
For each country, we analyzed the flows around the time of enactment of the 
totalization agreement. The longest time series available corresponds to foreign direct 
investments abroad and in the U.S. The FDI flow into the U.S. by source country before 
and after the date on which each totalization agreement became effective is shown in 
Figure 6. The left panel is the 10-country group with the highest levels of FDI in the 
U.S., and the right panel shows the other countries. Similarly, Figure 7 shows the flow of 
direct investment abroad by U.S. firms, with the same country grouping as in Figure 6. 
For most countries in both groups in Figure 6, investment in foreign firms’ U.S. 
affiliates increases over time. However, there is some variation in the growth patterns 
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around the time of an agreement’s implementation (t=0). For some countries — among 
them, the Netherlands, France, Luxemburg, South Korea, Sweden, and Belgium — the 
growth rate seems to have increased after the totalization agreement became effective, 
while growth of inward FDI from other countries — such as Japan and the U.K. — 
seems to have continued at the same pace as before the agreement. The inward FDI 
level from most countries in the group on the right remains very low for many years after 
the implementation of the agreements, or even for the full sample, such as the cases of 
Portugal, Greece, and Chile. 
Figure 7 shows that outward FDI of U.S. firms mostly grows over the sample 
period for most host countries. There do not seem to be sharp growth rate changes in 
outward FDI at the time of implementation of the agreements, except for a few host 
countries such as the U.K., the Netherlands, and France, which show a slight uptake on 
FDI growth after t = 0.  
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Figure 6: Inward U.S. FDI flows — direct investment in U.S. affiliates of foreign 




Figure 7: Outward U.S. FDI flows — direct investment in foreign affiliates of U.S. 





To analyze totalization agreements’ possible effects on the activities of 
multinational firms who benefit from them, we look at the evolution of total assets and 
employment around the time of treaty implementation. Figures 9 and 10 report, for each 
country and activity, two time series corresponding to different groups of firms. The time 
series available for the earliest years, in dotted lines with and without markers, 
correspond to activities of foreign multinational firms’ U.S. affiliates (1997 through 2006) 
and affiliates of American multinationals abroad (1997 through 2008) not in the banking 
sector. The most recent time series, in solid lines with and without markers, correspond 
to multinational affiliates in all sectors. Due to data limitations, we only report these for a 
series of countries with relatively recent totalization agreements: Australia, Chile, Japan, 
and Poland. 
For countries with available data encompassing years before and after the 
adoption of the agreements, Figure 8 shows examples of event studies corresponding 
to the total assets of affiliates of foreign firms in the U.S. and of American firms abroad. 
The evolution of total assets displays a similar pattern in all four countries. For both 
affiliates of American firms abroad and foreign firms in the U.S., total assets increase 
around the time of agreement implementation, except in Poland where the asset levels 
of Polish affiliates in America remain low throughout the sample period. In the case of 
U.S. affiliates in Poland, the year of implementation of the totalization agreement 
coincides with the change in time series, and therefore the trend cannot be assessed 
around this time. There seems to be no clear break in trend around the time of the 
totalization agreement enactment for these countries. 
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Figure 8: Total assets of multinational firms around the time of totalization 
agreements effective dates 
 
Source: BEA 
Figure 9 shows the same countries’ event studies presenting the total 
employment of affiliates of foreign firms in the U.S. and of American firms abroad. Not 
all countries show the same pattern. American multinationals’ affiliates in Chile and 
Poland seem to have increased total employment over the sample period, although no 
clear trend break is observable around the time of agreement implementation. The 
employment of U.S. affiliates of Chilean and Polish firms is negligible.  
There is no clear trend in employment for Australian affiliates in the U.S. nor for 
American affiliates in Australia. For Japan, it appears employment trends changed 
around the time of the totalization agreement with the U.S., but we cannot assume the 
agreement was the cause. It certainly does not seem totalization agreements increased 
the employment levels of American affiliates in Japan, Australia, or Chile. For the case 
of Poland, the break in time series combined with a positive trend overall make it difficult 
to draw any conclusion. 
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Figure 9: Total employment of multinational firms around the time of totalization 
agreements’ effective dates 
 
Source: BEA 
Taxpayers who claim the foreign-earned income exclusion must submit tax Form 
2555 to the IRS. Figure 10 shows the number of 2555 tax forms submitted to the IRS, 
for a few source-of-income countries that enacted totalization agreements during the 
data sample period. The totalization agreements with the Netherlands, Chile, and 
Australia became effective in, respectively, 1990, 2001, and 2002. The figure shows this 
variable’s evolution over time as a proxy for the number of American workers earning 
income abroad in each of these countries. For the case of the Netherlands, the number 
of workers submitting 2555 forms is higher after 1991. Australia shows an increasing 
pattern up to the totalization agreement’s implementation, then fluctuation in the 




Figure 10: Foreign-earned income credit exclusion forms 2555 submitted to IRS, 




To analyze the analog — the number of foreign workers who may come to the 
U.S. under a totalization agreement — we look at the evolution over time of certain 
nonimmigrant visa categories, which may serve as a proxy for this quantity.21 The data 
is available from the U.S. Department of State since 1997. 
Figure 11 shows the number of these visa categories issued by the U.S. since 
2000 until 2014 for nationals of three countries that signed totalization agreements 
during that period: Chile (2001), Japan (2005), and Poland (2009). There is no clear 
pattern across these countries around the agreement’s effectiveness dates. Chile 
shows an increasing trend until 2010; Japan displays a continuously declining trend; 
finally, Poland shows a spike in 2006, the year after the agreement came into effect. 
                                               
21 As mentioned previously, though not everyone coming to the U.S. with a certain type of visa 
necessarily is covered by a totalization agreement, changes in inflows from partner countries 
of individuals with the relevant visas are likely to be strongly correlated with changes in the 
number of individuals covered by an agreement. 
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This later disappears and the annual number of visas after the agreement shows no 
clear trend.22 
Figure 11: Number of nonimmigrant visas (E-1, E-2, H1-B, H1-B1, H2-B, L-1, and L-
2) issued by the U.S. by nationality of the worker 
 
Source: U.S. Department of State 
Using the available data for all 26 countries, we ran regressions of outward and 
inward FDI flows. The regressions correspond to the years 1966 to 2017, although data 
are not available for every country-year combination. Data are more often available for 
outgoing FDI than incoming FDI, so sample sizes for regressions for the former are 
larger (1,194) than for the latter (878).  
The dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine of outward FDI (in 2015 
dollars), or the inverse hyperbolic sine of inward FDI (also in 2015 dollars). The inverse 
hyperbolic sine is very similar to a log transform for positive numbers that are not close 
                                               
22 Given the differential characteristics of each visa type, we analyzed these different visa 
categories separately to gain further insights. For example, the visa category L-1 for 
intracompany transferee for managerial and executive personnel is of particular interest to this 
question. However, this provided little information, as there is no pattern in the behavior over 
time for each individual visa category. The exception is Japan, where all visa categories 
considered show a declining trend over time. 
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to zero, but is well-defined for zero and negative values as well and, therefore, is 
commonly used for variables that may have a nontrivial number of zeros or negative 
values. We used this because it happens occasionally that FDI is zero or negative, 
especially for incoming flows. The basic model includes country dummies, year 
dummies, and an “after” dummy for whether the treaty has taken effect. We also 
estimated specifications where we add dummies for the last three years before 
enactment and/or the first three years after, to capture anticipation or startup effects. 
We used two-way clustering of the standard errors by country and year (see, e.g., 
Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2011). 
The results for the basic and most extensive models are reported in Table 7. The 
first two columns report FDI results of American firms abroad, while the third and fourth 
columns correspond to FDI by foreign firms in the U.S. For outgoing FDI, there is a 
large and statistically significant effect of the treaty taking effect. The coefficients 
translate roughly into a 15% to 25% jump in FDI after the treaty takes effect.  
There is weak evidence for anticipation effects: The coefficients for the three 
years before the treaty takes effect are large and positive, but they are only significant 
at the 10% level. There is little evidence for gradual startup effects after the treaty takes 
effect: The coefficients are much smaller and not statistically significant (these 
coefficients are relative to more than three years after the treaty takes effect). The 
coefficients for incoming FDI also are large and positive, but these data are much more 
variable than the data for outgoing FDI (several countries have very low, even negative, 
net values of FDI to the U.S.), reflected in the large standard errors. Hence, we cannot 
draw firm conclusions about incoming FDI. 
We have also estimated a specification where we add the (log) exchange rate 
versus the U.S. dollar and a dummy for whether the Euro had been adopted (= 1 in 
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2002 or later for all Euro countries except Slovakia, where it is 2009 or later; = 0 in all 
other cases). The coefficients of these two variables are far from statistically significant 
and they do not materially change the conclusions. 
As seen in Figures 6 and 7, the countries are heterogeneous in terms of the size 
of their investments made in the U.S., and also in terms of the flows of investment they 
receive from America. Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that the totalization 
agreements affect multinational firms’ decisions regarding location of foreign affiliates. 
However, the aggregate magnitude of these effects may be small. The effects’ 
complexities require a look at the channels through which these treaties modify the 
firms’ incentives. The effects for each pair of countries likely will depend on each 
country’s relative advantages in terms of factor endowments, productivity, and tax rates. 
The next section highlights some of these considerations. 
Table 7: Regression results for outward and inward FDI flows around the time of 
the totalization agreements effective dates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Regressor FDI of American firms abroad FDI of foreign firms in the U.S. 
After treaty 0.329** 0.492** 0.478 1.065 
 (0.125) (0.174) (0.703) (1.005) 
Last year before  0.345*  1.105 
  (0.139)  (0.660) 
Second year before  0.334*  1.256* 
  (0.132)  (0.615) 
Third year before  0.280*  1.422* 
  (0.113)  (0.596) 
Year of treaty  -0.087  -0.313 
  (0.122)  (0.715) 
Second year  -0.101  -0.124 
  (0.112)  (0.447) 
Third year  -0.098  -0.053 
  (0.127)  (0.440) 
N 1194 1194 878 878 
R2 0.828 0.829 0.755 0.759 
Note: Country dummies, year dummies, and constant included in the model but not shown. 
Standard errors in parentheses two-way clustered by country and year. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; 
*** p < 0.01. 
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4. Quantitative framework 
4.1 Theoretical model  
As a benchmark, we used a dynamic general equilibrium model of FDI, extending 
the quantitative framework of the world allocation of firm-embedded productivity 
developed by Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009). A long tradition in the literature links 
firm-embedded productivity to the management know-how and skills of individuals 
leading the firm. Management know-how is similar to codified technological knowledge, 
as it can be reallocated across sectors, regions, and, albeit imperfectly, countries. 
Burstein and Monge-Naranjo extended a standard neoclassical model to account for 
limited span of control by introducing management know-how as an additional factor of 
production. A model with a limited span of control is well suited for multinational 
production because it reflects managerial know-how, which shapes the firm's 
productivity, is difficult to reproduce at the affiliate level: A manager with certain abilities 
can control only a limited amount of production inputs at a given location.  
In the model, firms are teams of managers, workers, and capital — as in Lucas 
(1978). Each country has domestic supplies of labor and of management skills, both of 
which can change over time. Managers can reallocate their skills and lead firms in 
foreign countries, where they face country-specific taxes. Capital can also be 
reallocated across countries. This reallocation of resources across borders gives rise to 
FDI in this model.23 
                                               
23 FDI measures include greenfield investments and mergers and acquisitions. In this model, 
greenfield FDI corresponds to a joint transfer of capital and firm-embedded productivity from 
the source to the host country. Mergers and acquisitions correspond to a transfer of firm-
embedded productivity with an ownership reassignment on existing capital. Other forms of 
capital inflows (such as portfolio equity flows or corporate debt) correspond in the model to 
capital investments by foreign agents, or capital transfers between domestic and foreign 
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We adapted this model to incorporate U.S. and foreign social security and 
income taxes. These taxes may distort the compensation of managers and skilled 
workers who are relocated abroad and, thus, the firms’ decisions about such 
relocations. The extent to which this happens depends on the existence of totalization 
agreements between countries. The model allows us to study the impact these treaties 
have on firms’ foreign operations decisions. We did not explicitly model aspects relevant 
to workers’ decisions, such as how moving abroad affects their Social Security 
eligibility.24 We focused on the effects of totalization agreements as analogous to payroll 
taxes in the firms’ problem for the case of managers. This allowed us to account for the 
changes in the costs of sending employees abroad. 
4.1.1 Production at the firm level 
There is a single, freely-traded consumption good. Production of this good is 
carried out by firms, and requires capital services, labor services, and leadership. The 
firm has two types of employees: workers (who provide the labor services) and 
managers (who make decisions for the firm and provide know-how and management 
skills). The output of a firm that has x units of management know-how, l units of labor, 
and k units of physical capital, and is operating in country i is given by a Cobb-Douglas 
type production function of the form 𝑦𝑦 = 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝜈𝜈(𝑘𝑘𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙1−𝛼𝛼)1−𝜈𝜈 , where 𝑣𝑣 ∈ (0,1) is the share of 
                                                                                                                                                  
agents not complemented with inflows of foreign firm-embedded productivity. Finally, other 
management know-how transfers not associated with capital ownership (e.g., foreign 
managers working in a firm with domestically owned capital) correspond in the model to 
inflows of foreign embedded productivity with no changes in the quantity or ownership of 
capital, and are not included in any capital flow measure in the data. 
24 Under certain assumptions, such as risk neutrality and perfect foresight, the complex decision 
problem of a worker choosing between possible job offers affecting their future social security 
benefits is analogous to a simpler model where the compensation in each job offer is a 
sufficient statistic to capture the relevant differences in job benefits. 
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management know-how in output and 𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝜈𝜈) ∈ (0,1) is the share of physical capital in 
output. The term 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 reflects the country-specific productivity, as given by its 
infrastructure, laws and regulations, human capital levels, and other nontradeable 
aspects that affect production possibilities. Management skills x determine firm-specific 
productivity and can be allocated across countries. 
Managers decide in which country to establish the firm. They look to maximize 
their own pay and firm profits. When a firm from country j sends firm-embedded 
productivity to country i, it produces output 𝑦𝑦 = 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑣𝑣(𝑘𝑘𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙1−𝛼𝛼)1−𝜈𝜈. Managers 
compensation is 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 if they work in country i or 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 if they work in country j. This type of 
cross-border allocation of management power (and firm-embedded productivity) is 
closely connected to the concept of FDI.25 
4.1.2 Taxation  
Governments in each country set taxes on income and payroll that apply to labor 
and managerial skills. Payroll tax rates may differ between domestic firm-embedded 
productivity (𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷) and foreign firm-embedded productivity (𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹). Managers from country i 
receive a net salary of (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷)𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 if they work in country i or (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝐹𝐹)𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 if they work in 
country j. As mentioned in Section 2, in most countries there is a cap to wages subject 
to social security, gi, such that payroll taxes are only paid on earnings up to gi. If 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 > 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖, 
the net-of-tax profits for managers are given by (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷)𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + (𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖).  
                                               
25 FDI is a category of cross-border investment made by a resident in one economy with the 
objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in an economy other than 
that of the direct investor. The motivation of the direct investor is a strategic, long-term 
relationship with the direct investment enterprise to ensure a significant degree of influence by 
the direct investor in the management of the direct investment enterprise. Direct investment 
may also allow the direct investor to gain access to the economy of the direct investment 
enterprise which it might otherwise be unable to do. (OECD 2008) 
45 
4.1.3 Equilibrium in a two-country case 
Country i has an endowment of 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 workers and an aggregate of 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 units of firm-
specific productivity or management skills.26 Workers are assumed to be immobile, 
remaining in their countries, but managers are internationally mobile and carry their 
know-how with them to whatever country they move to. Physical capital can be 
internationally traded, and the country’s endowment is Ki. We assume that the country’s 
endowments of workers, managers, and physical capital are fixed. 
We assume factor prices are determined in competitive markets, and workers 
earn wages 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 while managers are compensated at a rate 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 per unit of managerial 
skill. All firms in country i face the same factor prices. In equilibrium, factor prices equal 
the marginal product of each factor. Therefore, the firms’ profits equal the managerial 
compensation, 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖. Appendix A.1 lists these equilibrium prices. Absent any differences 
among firms, all employ the same combination of workers and managers. Aggregate 
output in country i is: 
 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖𝜈𝜈(𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖1−𝛼𝛼)1−𝜈𝜈, (1) 
 
where 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖 represents the total net managerial power used in country i and 𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖 is the total 
physical capital operating in country i. Due to international mobility of managers and 
capital, 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖 and 𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖 may be smaller or larger than the country’s endowments, Xi and Ki. 
Analogous notation applies to country j. To obtain stylized results, we consider a 
                                               
26 We assume the labor force share of workers and managers to be fixed. Considering the low 
elasticity of labor to payroll contributions (Gruber 1997) and the relatively low share of 
multinational firms in the economy, it is unlikely that changes in double taxation derived from 
totalization agreements will have a first order impact on the individual decisions to become 
workers or managers, making this a safe simplifying assumption. 
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simplified model in which the world consists of two countries. Hence, the world 
aggregate constraints for these factors are:  
 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋�𝑗𝑗 = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 , and 𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖 + 𝐾𝐾�𝑗𝑗 = 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 + 𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗 . (2) 
Allocation of managerial effort 
The worldwide equilibrium allocates management know-how by equalizing its 
net-of-tax marginal product across countries. A country attracts more foreign 
management know-how the lower its domestic supply, the higher its country-specific 
productivity, and the lower its tax rate on the returns to foreign management know-how. 
These implications echo the results in Helpman (1984) that inflows of multinational firms 
are more prevalent in countries with a relative scarcity of factors intensively used by 
headquarter services (e.g., management, marketing, and R&D), but with relative 
richness in factors used intensively in production activities (e.g., unskilled labor). Hence, 
we expect to find different effects of totalization agreements with developed countries 
than with developing economies. 
The allocation of managerial effort across countries depends on their differences 
in terms of taxes on foreign managers, factor endowments, and the relative country-
specific productivity. In an interior equilibrium where country i exports firm-embedded 
productivity to country j, net-of-tax profits for managers from country i must be equal 
across both countries. In such an equilibrium, we define 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 implicitly and the share of 











When the social security cap is binding in both countries, equalizing the net of tax 
profits for managers leads to: (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷)𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + (𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖) = �1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝐹𝐹�𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗 + (𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 − 𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗) if 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 > 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 
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and 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 > 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖. But if 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 and 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗, the equalization of net-of-tax profits for 
managers requires: 
 (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷)𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝐹𝐹)𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 (4) 
 









𝐷𝐷, this implies that 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 > 0, 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 0 
(i.e., country i is a source of FDI and country j is the host.) 
Appendix A.1 shows the derivation of the equilibrium level of foreign-controlled 
managerial power and the share of firm-embedded productivity controlled by foreign 





































The share of foreign firm-embedded production in country j, s, is higher when country j 
is more productive, when it has more capital and labor and less managerial capacity 
relative to country i, when the taxes on foreign management are lower in country j, and 
when the taxes on own management are higher in country i. 
The international movements of capital are determined by equalizing the return to 
physical capital across the countries, net of depreciation and taxes:  
 (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾)(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 − 𝛿𝛿) = ?̅?𝑟𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾 = 𝑟𝑟∗  (7) 
 
Substituting in the expressions for factor prices, we obtain the equilibrium level of 















Consumption and investment 
Assuming a stationary equilibrium with no growth implies the levels of 
consumption and the stock of capital are constant over time, in equilibrium: 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 and 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  = 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖. Therefore, investment is given by 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 −
(1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖, where 𝛿𝛿 is the depreciation rate of physical capital. Government 
taxation is redistributed as lump sum transfers to consumers. In autarky, the economy 
resource constraint is given by: 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖. In an open economy, the economy’s 
resource constraint takes into account the payment to and from foreign factors. If the 
country is a net source of managerial power, i.e. Xij>0, the resource constraint in this 
economy is given by: 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾�𝑗𝑗 = �1 − �1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝐹𝐹�𝑠𝑠𝜈𝜈�𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 + 𝑟𝑟∗(𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗 − 𝐾𝐾�𝑗𝑗), which takes into 
account the revenues from factors producing abroad. Absorption (consumption plus 
investment) in each country equals aggregate output minus the net payments to foreign 
factors.  
International trade balance 
The trade balance of country i is given by: 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 − 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖, which results in: 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 = �
−�1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝐹𝐹�𝑠𝑠𝜈𝜈𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 − 𝑟𝑟∗ (𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 − 𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖)�����
>0
< 0, if  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 > 0,     and
�1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝐹𝐹�𝑠𝑠𝜈𝜈𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 − 𝑟𝑟∗ (𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 − 𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖)�����
<0
> 0,   if  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 < 0.       
 
Thus, the model predicts that countries with net FDI outflows run a trade balance deficit 
as they have to make payments to foreign factors. Conversely, the country with the net 
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FDI inflows runs a trade balance surplus with its partner country.27 Refer to Appendix 
A.1 for the proof.  
4.1.4 The effects of international social security totalization agreements 
Totalization agreements reduce the burden of payroll taxation for a firm’s 
employees assigned abroad. This is reflected in a lower value of τ after the totalization 
agreement is put effectively in place. Appendix A.1 shows that, if country i is a net 
sender of managers to country j, the model predicts that, by decreasing the foreign 
payroll tax rate for managers in country j, the totalization agreement increases the 
foreign share of production controlled by country i. This increase will be larger with 
higher ratios of capital, labor endowments, and country-specific productivity of country i 
to country j. 
The model predicts that the increase in the share of foreign-controlled capital in 
country j, given a tax decrease on foreign managers in that country, will be higher the 
more productive is the economy of country j, the less productive is country i, the higher 
is the ratio of the workforce size in country j relative to country i, and the higher is the 
country i’s tax on local managers. The derivation of this property is in Appendix A.1. 
Based on the information presented in Sections 2 and 3, this indicates that a totalization 
agreement’s effect with the U.S. would be different for Chile, Germany, or Japan. The 
next section explores whether the effect of a totalization agreement with Germany or 
Japan may be stronger for inward FDI to the U.S. than for outward FDI. 
                                               
27 This is a well-known characteristic of international firm production models with horizontal 
integration. The way to overcome this (mostly counterfactual) correlation between FDI flows 
and trade flows is to allow for vertical integration of multinational production (see Irarrazabal et 
al. 2013). 
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4.2 Numerical exercises 
We used the calibrated model to simulate the steady-state levels of economic 
output, capital investment, and factor prices under scenarios where the totalization 
agreements are or are not in effect. The difference between these two cases (with or 
without totalization agreements) provides an estimate of the totalization agreements’ 
impact on the outcomes of interest. It is worth noting that these effects are isolated from 
everything else that affects firms’ decisions regarding the location of their activities. We 
do not speak to any of the channels not included in the model.  
Totalization agreements’ effect on macroeconomic outcomes is likely to vary by 
partner country for two main reasons. First, the differences in the provisions of 
totalization agreements mentioned in Section 2 can imply different effects by reducing 
or strengthening the propagation channel in the model. For example, the totalization 
agreement with Italy does not include a “detached-worker rule,” in which a person who 
is temporarily transferred to work for the same employer in another country remains 
covered only by the country from which he or she has been sent, whereas other 
totalization agreements do include such a rule. Second, the characteristics of the 
countries (such as their labor force composition, productivity, etc.) affect the extent to 
which a totalization agreement has an impact on the outcomes of interest. 
Though it was not within this project’s scope to analyze the impacts of each of 
the individual totalization agreements, this model provides insights into how totalization 
agreements’ impacts likely vary depending on the type of agreement and country 
characteristics. Given data availability and variation in country characteristics, we 
selected three cases of totalization agreements and used our model to show how their 
impacts may vary. In particular, the effects of totalization agreements signed with 
developed industrialized countries are expected to be different than those of 
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agreements signed with developing countries: Larger economies are more 
complementary to the U.S. in terms of investment opportunities for American investors 
and workforce composition, while less developed economies provide more opportunities 
to profit from relative advantages.  
Because of this, we performed simulations for Germany, which signed a 
totalization agreement with the U.S. in 1979, Japan (2005), and Chile (2001). For Japan 
and Chile, we used the model to simulate the equilibrium effect of these treaties and 
compare it with the state of the economy at the time of implementation. The necessary 
data for Germany do not go back to 1979. To overcome this difficulty, we used the most 
recent data available to perform a counterfactual exercise evaluating the effects if the 
agreement were to be cancelled. The model parameterization and quantification are 
described in Appendix A.2.  
On average, workers under totalization agreements have salaries above the 
contribution caps for social security. To account for this, we approximate the social 
security tax rates with the effective tax rates after taking into account the salary cap for 
social security contributions.28 Details are in Appendix A.2. We use these rates (Tables 
A.3 and A.4 in Appendix A.2) to compute the differentials in effective payroll tax rates on 
foreign managers implied by the implementation of the totalization agreements, shown 
in Table 8. These differentials indicate that the totalization agreements made FDI flows 
between the U.S. and the partner countries less expensive, indicating that both inward 
and outward FDI flows should increase in the U.S. as a result.  
                                               
28 Totalization agreements cover the U.S. Medicare portion of social security taxes. Therefore, 
in the calculations for the U.S. Social Security payroll taxes, we include the 12.4% OASDI tax 
(subject to an earnings cap) and the 2.9% Medicare tax on earnings. 
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Table 8: Changes in implied effective tax rate (in percentage points) as 
consequence of totalization agreements implementation 
 Origin country: U.S. 






Japan - 17.8 p.p. Japan 
 -15.3 p.p. 
Chile - 2.1 p.p. Chile -15.3 p.p. 
Germany - 7.8 p.p. Germany -15.3 p.p 
4.2.1 Simulation and counterfactual exercises 
We used data to quantify the model equilibrium at the time of the agreements’ 
implementations, as explained in Appendix A.2. We then evaluated the impact of the 
agreements on FDI flows and other macroeconomic variables. Table 10 shows the 
results from these exercises, indicating how different outcomes change relative to the 
baseline. These simulations are for illustration of the potential magnitude of these 
effects, assuming all other factors driving FDI decisions besides taxes remain constant. 
Japan: The model predicts that on net, the implementation of this totalization 
agreement increased the incentives of Japanese firms to reallocate their operations to 
the U.S., resulting in net FDI inward flows from Japan to the U.S. The empirical 
evidence in Section 2 showed that Japan had large FDI in the U.S., resulting in the U.S. 
having net liabilities with Japan, even before 2005. This indicates that the 
implementation of the totalization agreement with Japan incremented Japanese 
investments in the U.S., both in the form of capital as well as managerial power. This 
would have acted on top of any other influences driving up Japan’s inward FDI before 
the treaty. 
Chile: The totalization agreement decreased the average foreign effective tax 
rate on managers from U.S. firms affiliates in Chile by 15.3 percent points. According to 
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the model, the manager allocations between Chile and the U.S. were almost balanced 
before the totalization agreement; there was no incentive for further affiliates. But the 
totalization agreement’s implementation increased the incentives of American firms to 
send managers and investments to their Chilean affiliates. The totalization agreement 
with Chile increased American firms’ incentives to engage in FDI in that country. This is 
not at odds with the evidence in Section 3.5, where assets and employment levels of 
American affiliates in Chile showed positive growth around the time of the 
implementation of the treaty. 
Germany: The counterfactual exercise about Germany consists in simulating the 
effects of removing the totalization agreement in 2015, which is as recently as allowed 
by the available data. This simulation predicts that the current totalization agreement 
makes the net flow of investments between the U.S. and Germany almost even, with a 
slight balance in favor of the U.S. If the agreement were to be removed, U.S. firms 
would decrease their outward FDI flows to German affiliates and German firms would 
increase their FDI flows to the U.S. in such a magnitude that the German FDI inflows to 
the U.S. would be larger than the U.S. FDI outflows to Germany. This implies that this 
agreement is facilitating American investments in Germany beyond other forces. The 
U.S. has become a net investor in German capital as a consequence. 
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Table 10: Summary of simulations for totalization agreement effects on Japan, 
Chile, and Germany 
 Totalization agreement 
 Effect of implementation Counterfactual: elimination 
 Japan (2005) Chile (2001) Germany (2015) 
Host country U.S. Chile Germany 
Relative changes in 
outcomes:    
∆τF (in percentage points) -15.3p.p. -2.1p.p. -7.8p.p. 
∆ foreign-controlled share 
of production of host 
country (percentage 
change) 
+6.2% +2.8% -6.4% 
∆ capital flows From host To host To host 
∆ trade balance of the U.S. 
with partner country Increase (surplus) Decrease (deficit) Increase (surplus) 
By construction, the model assumes the forces that explain FDI flows are 
differences between countries in endowments (labor, physical capital, and firm-
embedded productivity), country-specific productivity, and payroll taxes. Under these 
assumptions, totalization agreements have significant impacts on the countries’ 
allocation of management talent (and FDI decisions).  
Conclusions  
Social security international totalization agreements reduce double taxation on 
social security burdens and reduce the risk of not qualifying for social security benefits 
for persons working in a foreign country during part of their careers. Hence, these 
agreements make it more attractive for individuals to temporarily work abroad and 
increase employers’ incentives to invest in the foreign country and send their workers to 
oversee operations in partner countries.  
55 
As the number of totalization agreements with partner countries has increased,  
the number of workers covered by the agreements has correspondingly increased 
exponentially. However, the magnitude of these flows is small relative to the overall 
workforce. From the data, we infer there are no large effects on labor mobility induced 
by totalization agreements.  
We find evidence that these agreements are associated with higher flows of FDI 
in and out of the U.S. The evidence suggests an impact of totalization agreements on 
the outward flows of FDI from the U.S. to foreign countries, but it is not as clear with 
respect to inward flows. Measuring the effects of these agreements in reduced form is 
challenging because the characteristics of the partner economies and their social 
security systems affect not only the size but also the direction of the effects on net flows 
of investment. 
To overcome this limitation, we use a stylized macroeconomic model to generate 
predictions of the expected effects from these agreements. The model suggests that 
firms in the U.S. are more likely to benefit from the economic opportunity provided by a 
totalization agreement than firms in foreign countries.  
The agreements affect the fraction of income that has to be paid in payroll taxes 
and which country’s social security system receives these taxes. The model shows that 
such an agreement, by decreasing the cost of relocating productive inputs across 
borders, increases the flows of foreign capital and investments a country receives. The 
FDI flows of U.S. firms increase with the enactment of totalization agreements. The 
increase in the share of foreign-controlled capital in a (host) country, given a decrease 
in the tax on foreign managers in that country, will be higher the more productive is the 
economy of country j, the less productive is country i, the higher is the ratio of the 
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workforce size in country j relative to country i, and the higher is the country i’s tax on 
local managers. 
The quantitative exercises predict that the totalization agreement increased the 
incentives of Japanese firms to reallocate their operations to the U.S., resulting in net 
inward investment flows from Japan to the U.S. For Chile, however, the quantitative 
exercise indicates that the agreement made it more profitable for American firms to 
send managers and investments to their Chilean affiliate, indicating that the direction of 
the net effect depends on the relative characteristics of the partner country. The 
counterfactual exercise about Germany simulated the effects of removing the existing 
totalization agreement. This simulation predicts that if the agreement were removed, 
U.S. firms would decrease their investments in their German affiliates and German firms 
would increase flows of capital and investment to the U.S. The results suggest that this 
agreement almost evens out German investments in the U.S. and U.S. investments in 
Germany (due to the channels considered within the model), preventing the U.S. from 
being a net receptor of German investments. 
Taken together, the empirical evidence and quantitative model indicate that 
totalization agreements facilitate the reallocation of productive factors and investments 
across borders by making it cheaper for multinational firms to expand their operations 
abroad. Increased economic production affects factor payments, workers incomes, and 
government revenues. The magnitudes and direction of those impacts depend on the 
combination of characteristics of the U.S. and the partner country. 
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Appendices 
A.1 Equilibrium of the theoretical model 
In a competitive equilibrium, the price of each factor equals its marginal 
productivity, thus the wage for workers is 
 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)(1 − 𝜈𝜈) 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖/𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 , (a.1) 
 
the price of managerial know-how is 
 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝜈𝜈𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖/𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, (a.2) 
 
and the rental rate for capital is 
 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝜈𝜈)𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖/𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖. (a.3) 
 
Share of firm-embedded productivity in country j controlled by foreign firms 
If, in equilibrium, country i is the source of managerial power, and country j is the 
host, then 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 > 0 and 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 0, thus: 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗. We solve the case when the social 
security wage caps are not binding. The qualitative properties follow to the case with 
binding caps, but this approximation allows us to obtain closed-form solutions for most 
outcomes. The allocation of firm-specific know-how is done through the equalization of 
the firms returns, net of tax, shown in equation (4). If taxes are such that 





 , (a.4) 
 
then (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹)𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 < (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷)𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗, which is a condition for country i to be the source and 
country j the host. To find the equilibrium level of 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖, we use equations (a.2) and (3) in 
(a.4): 
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 (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷)𝜈𝜈𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�
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 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋�𝑗𝑗 (a.7) 
 


































The share of foreign firm-embedded production in country j is higher when country j is 
more productive, when it has more capital, more labor, less own managerial power 
relative to country i, when the taxes on foreign management are lower in country j and 
when the taxes on own management are higher in country i. 
Consumption and investment 
Aggregate consumption in each country equals aggregate output minus the net 
payments to foreign management know-how. Government taxation is redistributed as 
lump sum transfers to consumers. 
Assuming a stationary equilibrium with no growth implies the levels of 
consumption and the stock of capital are constant over time, in equilibrium: 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 
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and 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖. Therefore, 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖. In autarky, the economy 
resource constraint is then given by: 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖.  
In the open economy, if 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 > 0, the economy’s resource constraint takes into 
account the revenues from factors producing abroad and is given by: 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 +
�1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝐹𝐹�𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝑟𝑟∗(𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 − 𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖) = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖. This implies that 
𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾�𝑗𝑗 = �1 − �1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝐹𝐹�𝑠𝑠𝜈𝜈�𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 + 𝑟𝑟∗(𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗 − 𝐾𝐾�𝑗𝑗) 
consumption in the host country j increases when it receives more FDI. However, 
whether the agreement makes the level of consumption in source country i increase or 
decrease depends on whether the extra revenues from FDI are enough to compensate 
for the resulting decrease in output in country i.  
To compute the ratio of physical capital operating in each country, 𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖/𝐾𝐾�𝑗𝑗 , and the 
ratio of managerial power in use in each country, 𝑋𝑋�𝑗𝑗/𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖, we use the no-arbitrage 
condition on physical capital allocation, (6), and the equalization of firm profits used to 
solve the allocation of managerial power across countries, (a.7). We obtain a system of 



































The effect of international social security totalization agreements 
Totalization agreements reduce the burden of payroll taxation for the firm 
employees who are allocated abroad. This is reflected on a lower value of 𝜏𝜏𝐹𝐹 after the 
totalization agreement is effective. To analyze the qualitative impact of totalization 
agreements, we consider what happens to the share of inputs of country j controlled by 
a foreign country i in an equilibrium with such an agreement in place. We take 
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derivatives of the equilibrium ratio of physical capital operating in each country with 














A totalization agreement, by decreasing the effective value of 𝜏𝜏𝑗𝑗𝐹𝐹, increases the ratio of 
physical capital operating in the host country with respect to the source country. Taking 
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For a wide range of plausible parameterizations of the model, including the one 
we use (see Table A.1), 𝛼𝛼𝜈𝜈
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Thus, the model predicts that, by decreasing the host country’s effective payroll tax rate 
for foreign managers, a totalization agreement causes the foreign share of production 
controlled by the source to increase. This increase will be larger the lower is the share 
of foreign-controlled production in the host country. 
 
A.2 Quantitative exercises 
Data 
We quantified the model using data on output Y (GDP), aggregate employment 
𝑁𝑁, physical capital operating in each country (𝐾𝐾�), and the average depreciation rate of 
physical capital (𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾) from the Penn World Table (version 9.0, Feenstra et al. 2015).  
There are two ways to measure of the share of inputs controlled by foreign firms, 
s. One is the share of labor employed by foreign firms and the other is the net share of 
capital controlled by foreign firms. We follow Burstein and Monge-Naranjo and proxy for 
the latter using data on FDI stocks. Because our simulations are partial equilibrium 
between only two countries, abstracting from the rest of the countries, we need to 
compute the share of the FDI stock corresponding to the partner country (as opposed to 
all the countries).  
𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 =
inward FDI stock in 𝑗𝑗 from 𝑖𝑖 −  outward FDI stock from 𝑗𝑗 to 𝑖𝑖
total capital stock in country 𝑖𝑖
  
We used data on FDI stocks from the updated and extended version of the the dataset 
constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) for the earlier years. We complement this 
with data from the OECD (2019) for the later years. For the earlier years, the FDI stocks 
are not available by partner country. Therefore, we use data from the BEA on FDI flows 
to approximate the share of the stocks corresponding to one source/host country by 
accounting for the average share of FDI flows from/to this country. 
For the relative size of workers with respect to managers in the labor force, we 
use data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), the Japan 2005 Population 
Census, the Chilean National Employment Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, 
ENE) and the Survey for Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) for 
Germany. We compute the share of the employed population who are not managers or 
65 
chief executives in the private sector, and that is our measure of workers in the 
economy, L/N. Table A.1 presents all these data. 
Table A.1: Variable values for simulations 
  2005 2001 2015 
  Japan USA Chile USA Germany USA 
Y GDP  4,846,675 15,578,813   223,073 13,430,655   3,790,519 18,181,462.4 
N Workforce (millions) 65.78 142.56 5.37 138.77 42.44 150.28 




managers 2.20% 2.32% 2.10% 3.30% 2.68% 2.15% 
Outward FDI stock 469,181 3,714,875 15,688 2,266,383 1,362,452 6,059,271 





4.3% 4.2% 3.3% 4.2% 3.8% 4.9% 
Note: Monetary values are in millions of 2015 USD. 
Parameter values 
The parameters of the model are mostly standard parameters in macroeconomic 
models — such as the depreciation rate of capital (δ) and the share of physical capital in 
the production function (αν) — and one model-specific parameter, which is the share of 
management in the production function (ν). We use data on the average depreciation 
rate of capital for each country from the Penn World Table. We follow Burstein and 
Monge-Naranjo’s parameterization for α and ν, shown in Table A.2.  
Table A.2 Parameter values 
Parameter Value by 
country 
Depreciation rate of capital δ  
Share of physical capital α(1−ν) 0.25 
Share of management ν 0.15 




Burstein and Monge-Naranjo choose the output share of capital so that the 
annual return to capital before taxes is equal to 5.5%. They set ν so that the share of 
nonmanagement labor in output, (1−α)(1-ν), is equal to 60%. This is the product of 67%, 
the average labor share in U.S. GDP over the period 1996 to 2000 (calculated, using 
data from the BEA, as the ratio of employee compensation to GDP, net of indirect taxes, 
subsidies, and proprietor’s income), and 90%, the share of wage compensation in 
nonmanagement occupations relative to total wage compensation in 2006 (wage 
compensation by occupation is calculated as the product of employment and average 
wage, using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics). 
Inferring model variables using aggregate data 
We can infer the endowment ratios of firm-embedded productivity by replacing 
equilibrium prices (a.2) in the arbitrage condition for international allocation of 
management know-how (4), and combining that with the world aggregate constraint on 












   , and thus: 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖







We use the information about the share of foreign-controlled inputs, s, and the 
aggregate product of each country on the benchmark year to compute the ratio of firm-
embedded productivity endowments. Note that the units of managerial skills might well 
be different than the actual number of managers in the workforce, hence this ratio is a 
better approximation. 
Using the definition of aggregate product (1), equilibrium prices (a.1 to 3) and the 








(1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷)𝜈𝜈𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗1−𝜈𝜈 (𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖1−𝛼𝛼)1−𝜈𝜈
  (a.10) 
 
We use data for factors, output, and taxes during the benchmark year to obtain the 
policy-invariable ratio of country-specific productivities. Knowing the optimal capital ratio 
after a change in taxes from Equation (a.9), we use it in Equation (a.10) to compute the 


















We back up the capital tax rates from the no-arbitrage condition, Equation (6): 










We assume an international real interest rate of r*=2%. We obtain average 
capital depreciation rates by country from the Penn World Table.  
Payroll tax rates and totalization agreements 
Table A.3 shows examples of how to compute the effective rates for the U.S., 
Germany, Japan, and Chile. The effective tax rates are computed considering the 
average salary earned by U.S. nationals working in those countries with certificates of 
coverage. Table A.4 shows the analog information for foreign workers in the U.S. For 
the average earnings of foreign managers, we used the earnings projections computed 
by SSA.29  
                                               
29 The average earnings of foreign managers by nationality in the CPS was of similar value, but 
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Table A.3: Example effective social security tax rates on average for Americans 
abroad, 2019 
Table A.4: Example effective social security tax rates on average for foreigners in 






in the US 
under TA 
Average 
foreigner in the 







foreigner in the 
US, under TA, 
with greater 
economic 
attachment to the 
U.S. 
Average foreigner 























Japan 382,163 17.80% 121,630 21,650 17.8% 18,609 15.3% 40,260 33.1% 
Germany 86,580 18.70% 121,630 16,190 13.3% 18,609 15.3% 34,800 28.6% 





        
  
                                                                                                                                                  














under TA, with 
greater economic 




under TA, with 
greater economic 






















Japan 382,163 17.80% 332,000 59,096 17.8% 27,296 8.2% 86,392 26.0% 
Germany 86,580 18.70% 209,000 16,190 7.7% 22,622 10.8% 38,812 18.6% 
Chile 36,000 13.50% 232,000 4,860 2.1% 23,496 10.1% 28,356 12.2% 
US 132,900 12.4%+2.9% 
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To choose the relevant tax rates for the simulation exercises, we assume greater 
economic attachment of Americans to the U.S. and of foreigners to the foreign country. 
For domestic taxes of foreigners, we assume foreigner managers earn the same salary 
in the U.S. as in their home countries, and compute effective rates as in Table A.4 
above.30  
                                               
30 This depends on the country and year of the exercise. The average earnings of U.S. 
managers in the 2015 CPS was $115,009 (below the $118,500 cap for that year). Therefore, 
in the counterfactual for Germany, we use the nominal rate of 15.3% (12.4% OASDI +2.9% 
Medicare tax). 
